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Tollefson and Ho: Responses to Citizen Submissions

UNDERSTANDING CANADA’S
RESPONSES TO CITIZEN
SUBMISSIONS UNDER THE NAAEC
CHRIS TOLLEFSON * & ANTHONY HO **

I.

INTRODUCTION

The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) is a side-agreement to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), to which the United States, Canada, and Mexico
are signatory parties (Parties). A central feature of the NAAEC is its
citizen submission on enforcement matters (SEM) process, by which
citizens and citizen groups from any of the three signatory countries can
call on the NAAEC Secretariat to consider whether a Party is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws. To date, there have been
eighty-one citizen submissions filed against the three Parties. 1
Much of the scholarship surrounding the SEM process has
concerned its efficacy, particularly from the perspective of citizens and
non-governmental organizations. 2 In contrast, there has been relatively
*
Professor of Law & Hakai Chair in Environmental Law and Sustainability, Faculty of Law,
University of Victoria, and Executive Director of University of Victoria Environmental Law Centre.
**
Juris Doctor & Master of Public Administration candidate, University of Victoria (2014); B.Sc.
(environmental sciences) & B.A. (political science), University of British Columbia (2010). Co-op
student, Environmental Law Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. The author would like
to thank the Environmental Law Centre, in particular its Executive Director Chris Tollefson, for
providing him with a rich and rewarding clinical learning experience.
1
Registry
of
Submissions,
COMMISSION
FOR
ENVTL.
COOPERATION,
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=751&SiteNodeID=250 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
2
E.g., JONATHAN GRAUBART, LEGALIZING TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: THE STRUGGLE TO
GAIN SOCIAL CHANGE FROM NAFTA’S CITIZEN PETITIONS (2008); PIERRE MARC JOHNSON &
ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE
NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996); Greg M. Block, NAFTA's Environmental Provisions: Are They
Working as Intended? Are They Adequate?—A View from Canada, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 409 (1997);
John H. Knox & David L. Markell, Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures: Lessons from an
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little work done that seeks to understand the manner in which the Parties
have interacted with this innovative SEM process. To assess whether and
to what extent the SEM process is working, and to envision ways that the
process (or analogous ones) might be improved, it is important to gain a
better understanding of how governments perceive and react to processes
of this kind. This Article represents a tentative foray into this research
area.
For this Article, we examined only SEM submissions against
Canada. We used a case-study approach, selecting three cases that help
illustrate any trend in the Canadian government’s response to SEM
submissions. 3 We then sought to understand Canada’s responses through
three theoretical perspectives: realism, pluralism, and institutionalism.
We begin by briefly describing the NAAEC and the SEM process in
Part II. Part III lays out three cases in which submitters alleged that
Canada had failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws and
Canada’s responses to each of them. This is followed in Part IV by a
discussion of trends in Canada’s responses arising from the case studies.
In Part V, we analyze Canada’s responses through three theoretical
perspectives. Finally, Part VI concludes by offering insights for further
research.
II.

THE NAAEC & THE SEM PROCESS

The NAAEC arose as a response to criticisms by environmental
groups during the negotiations for NAFTA. Environmental groups were
concerned that NAFTA would drive Canadian and American companies
to Mexico, where they could take advantage of more lenient
environmental standards. 4 The result was a side agreement whose
objectives include “the protection and improvement of the
environment” 5 and the enhancement of “compliance with, and
Analysis of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 505 (2012); David L.
Markell, The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation After Ten Years: Lessons
About Institutional Structure and Public Participation in Governance, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L. & COMP.
L. REV. 341 (2004); Isabel Studer, The NAFTA Side Agreements: Toward a More Cooperative
Approach?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 469 (2010).
3
This Article is limited to an analysis of the Canada’s “Party Responses” to SEM
submissions as described in Part II. Of course, governments can also respond to SEM submissions
through policy or legislative changes after the release of a factual record. However, this Article
examines the behaviour of Canada as an actor within the SEM process. Therefore, Canada’s policy
and legislative response outside the SEM process, the understanding of which is also an important
part of the bigger picture, is beyond the scope of this Article.
4
Knox & Markell, supra note 2, at 510.
5
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation art. 1(a), U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
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enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations.” 6 Article 5 states
that “each Party shall effectively enforce its environmental laws and
regulations through appropriate governmental action.” 7 The NAAEC
came into effect on January 1, 1994. 8
The NAAEC established the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC), which consists of a Council, a Secretariat, and a
Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC). 9 The Council is the governing
body of the CEC, and is made up of cabinet-level representatives from
the three Parties. 10 The Council meets annually in regular session, and in
special session at the request of any Party.11 The Secretariat provides
technical, administrative, and operational support to the Council, and is
headed by an Executive Director appointed by the Council for a threeyear term. 12 Each Party may appoint three members to the fifteenmember JPAC, which provides advice to the Council and information to
the Secretariat. 13 Each Party may also convene its own National
Advisory Committee (NAC) consisting of members of its public. 14
A hallmark feature of the NAAEC is its SEM process. Article 14
allows the Secretariat to “consider a submission from any nongovernmental organization or person asserting that a Party is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental law.” 15 If the submission meets
certain screening criteria, the Secretariat can request a response from the
Party in question. 16 Normally, the Party will have thirty days to
respond. 17 Article 15 allows the Secretariat to recommend to the Council
that a submission warrants the development of a factual record. 18 The
Council has the power, by two-thirds vote, to instruct the Secretariat to
proceed with the development of a factual record. 19
To date, there have been thirty-one SEM submissions against
Canada: 20
6

Id. art. 1(g).
Id. art. 5(1).
8
Id. art. 47.
9
Id. art. 8.
10
Id. art. 9(1), 10(1).
11
Id. art. 9(3).
12
Id. art. 11(1), (5).
13
Id. art. 16(1), (4), (5).
14
Id. art. 17.
15
Id. art. 14(1).
16
Id. art. 14(2).
17
Id. art. 14(3).
18
Id. art. 15(1).
19
Id. art. 15(2).
20
Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Canada, COMMISSION FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,
7
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Terminated due to not having met the criteria for proper
submission: twelve;
Secretariat is reviewing the submission: three;
Secretariat is reviewing the Party response: two;
Secretariat has recommended against developing factual
record: three;
Council has voted not to develop factual record: one;
Submitter withdrew from the SEM process: one; and
Factual record developed and published: eight.

III. CASE STUDIES INVOLVING SUBMISSIONS FILED AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
In this Part, we explore three case studies involving Canadian
government responses to Article 14 submissions: BC Hydro (SEM-97001), Ontario Logging I & II (SEM-02-001 & SEM-04-006), and Pulp
and Paper (SEM-02-003). To provide the context for Canada’s
responses, synopses of the submissions themselves are also presented.
We only provide a very brief description of the Secretariat’s factual
finding in each case for completeness, as the Secretariat’s findings are
not relevant to our analysis.
A.

BC HYDRO

On April 2, 1997, the Canadian-based Sierra Legal Defence Fund
(now Ecojustice) and the United States-based Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund (now Earthjustice) jointly filed the first major SEM submission
against Canada under Article 14 of the NAAEC. The submission, known
as BC Hydro, was filed on behalf of a cross-border coalition of Canadian
and American environmental groups: B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries
Commission, British Columbia Wildlife Federation, Trail Wildlife
Association, Steelhead Society, Trout Unlimited (Spokane Chapter),
Sierra Club (United States), Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s
Association, and Institute for Fisheries Resources. The submitters
asserted that the Canadian government had failed to enforce section
35(1) of the federal Fisheries Act 21 and section 119.06 of the federal
National Energy Board Act (NEB Act), 22 and in doing so failed to
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=546&BL_ExpandID=502 (last visited Nov. 20,
2013). The listed numbers add up to only thirty, because two of the submissions have been
consolidated by CEC Council Resolution 05-04.
21
Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 35(1), amended by 2012, c. 19, s. 142 (Can.).
22
National Energy Board Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7, s. 119.06, amended by 2012, c. 19, s. 94
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protect fish and fish habitat from environmental damage caused by the
hydroelectric power development in the province of British Columbia. 23
Although BC Hydro was not the first SEM submission against
Canada, it was the first that represented a serious challenge against the
Canadian government through the SEM process of the NAAEC. The one
submission that predated BC Hydro was Oldman River I, in which The
Friends of Oldman River claimed that the Canadian government had
failed to effectively enforce certain provisions of the federal Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act 24 and the Fisheries Act. 25 In Oldman
River I, the submitter’s description of the alleged failures to enforce was
somewhat vague and limited. Ultimately, the Secretariat recommended
against developing a factual record because the matter at issue was the
subject of an ongoing judicial proceeding. 26
In contrast to Oldman River I, the submitters in BC Hydro provided
a more robust description of Canada’s alleged failures to enforce its
habitat protection laws. The submitters’ main argument was twopronged. The first prong was that while B.C. Hydro had “consistently
and routinely violated section 35(1) [of the Fisheries Act],” the Canadian
government had laid only two charges against B.C. Hydro “despite clear
and well documented evidence that Hydro’s operations have damaged
fish habitat on numerous occasions.” 27
B.C. Hydro is a Crown corporation, wholly owned by the Province
of British Columbia, and responsible for the development and
maintenance of hydroelectric power infrastructure within much of the
province. The submitters claimed that B.C. Hydro’s regular operation of
hydroelectric dams “causes consistent and substantial damage to fish and
fish habitat.” 28 Section 35(1) of the Fisheries Act states that “[n]o person
shall carry on any work . . . that results in the harmful alteration,

(Can.).
23

Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Submission to the Commission on the Environmental
Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/97-001/01/SUB (Apr. 2, 1997), available at
www.cec.org/Storage/83/7858_ACF756.pdf [hereinafter BC Hydro Submission].
24
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, repealed by 2012, c. 19, s. 66
(Can.).
25
Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, The Friends of the Oldman River: North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Article 14 Submission, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/96003/04/RSUB (Oct. 8, 1996), available at www.cec.org/Storage/88/8478_96-3-RSUB-E.PDF.
26
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Determination Pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/96-003/12/15(1) (Apr. 2,
1997), available at www.cec.org/Storage/66/6019_96-3-DET-OE3.pdf.
27
BC Hydro Submission, supra note 23, at 1.
28
Id.
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disruption or destruction of fish habitat,” 29 and section 40(1) makes the
contravention of section 35(1) an offence. The term “harmful alteration,
disruption or destruction of fish habitat” is also known as “HADD.” The
submitters argued that B.C. Hydro’s operation of dams was causing
HADD in at least seven ways: 1) reduction in stream flow, 2) rapid
changes in flow, 3) inadequate flushing flows, 4) altered water quality, 5)
entrainment of fish, 6) flow diversion, and 7) reservoir drawdown. 30
According to the submission, both B.C. Hydro and the Canadian
government were aware of these Fisheries Act violations, but Canada
failed to enforce the law. The submitters quoted various documents that
tended to confirm that B.C. Hydro was aware its operations violated the
Fisheries Act. 31 Aside from this evidence, the submitters also provided
specific evidence of six instances in which B.C. Hydro, the relevant
federal authorities, or both were aware that dam operations harmed fish
and fish habitat. 32 Nevertheless, the submitters claimed that the Canadian
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (now Fisheries and Oceans Canada),
the federal authority responsible for the administration of the Fisheries
Act, had laid only two charges against B.C. Hydro despite “clear and
overwhelming evidence of [B.C.] Hydro’s violations of [the Act], and
the clear evidence of a decline in fish populations and habitat.”33
The second prong was that the federal National Energy Board
(NEB) had failed to consider the environmental impact of electricity
exportation contrary to the NEB Act. 34 The NEB is responsible for
making recommendations to the Canadian government regarding
applications for electricity export. The NEB Act provides a list of factors
that the NEB must consider when making such recommendations,
including “the impact of the exportation on the environment.” 35 It also
provides that the NEB should “avoid the duplication of measures taken
in respect of the exportation by the applicant and the government of the
province from which the electricity is exported.”36
The submitters alleged that the NEB failed its obligation to consider
the impact of electricity exportation on fish and fish habitat despite the

29

Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 35(1), amended by 2012, c. 19, s. 142 (Can.).
BC Hydro Submission, supra note 23, at 3-4.
31
Id. at 6-7.
32
These six instances included 1) Keenleyside Dam/Norns Creek fan, 2) Cranberry Creek, 3)
Revelstoke Dam, 4) Cheakamus River, 5) Shuswap Falls Project, and 6) Downton Lake. Id. at 5-6.
33
Id. at 10.
34
Id. at 1.
35
National Energy Board Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7, s. 119.06, amended by 2012, c. 19, s. 94
(Can.).
36
Id.
30
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lack of applicable provincial laws. They also challenged NEB’s claim
that the province was “actively regulating the activity at issue,” since
“[ninety-three percent] of the [provincial] water licenses held by [B.C.]
Hydro make no provision for the release and maintenance of water flows
necessary to conserve fish populations.” 37
On July 21, 1997, the Canadian government filed its Party Response
arguing that a factual record was unwarranted. 38 Canada raised several
threshold objections, including that the matter in question was the subject
of pending judicial and administrative proceedings, and that the alleged
enforcement failures arose prior to the NAAEC’s coming into force.
However, Canada’s principal argument was that the NAAEC
contemplated a different and a much broader concept of enforcement
than what the submitters had relied upon in their submission. According
to Canada, the “submission fail[ed] to appreciate the comprehensive
approach recognized in Article 5 and followed by Canada,” and “the
submission [was] based on a more limited view of enforcement, which
equate[d] enforcement directly with legal and judicial sanctions.” 39
Furthermore, Canada asserted that it used “a range of compliance
activities, from voluntary compliance and compliance agreements to
legal and judicial sanctions,” to effectively enforce its environmental
laws. 40
In support of this argument, Canada described in comprehensive
detail the federal regulatory regime relating to the protection of fish and
fish habitat. In so doing, Canada underscored that the NAAEC should be
interpreted in a way that allows each Party to make its own determination
of how best to enforce its domestic environmental laws. 41 To this end,
Canada situated its national fish habitat protection regime within the
larger context of the federal government, 42 broader enforcement and
compliance strategies such as emergency response and monitoring,43
Regional Technical Committees, 44 provincial Water Use Planning
(WUP) Initiative, 45 and Water Quality Guidelines. 46

37

BC Hydro Submission, supra note 23, at 11.
Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, BC Hydro—Party Response, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/97001/05/RSP (July 21, 1997), available at www.cec.org/Storage/87/8430_97-1-RSP-E.PDF.
39
Id. at 2.
40
Id. at 2.
41
Id. at 11.
42
Id. at 6-7.
43
Id. at 18.
44
Id. at 18-19.
45
Id. at 20-21.
46
Id. at 21.
38
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Canada also defended itself against the specific allegations of
enforcement failures set out in the submission. These included detailed
rebuttals to each of the submitters’ seven allegations, a tabular exposition
on the range of enforcement instruments that Canada had used to protect
fish and fish habitat in streams that contain B.C. Hydro facilities, and a
list of orders and authorizations issued to B.C. Hydro since 1990.47
Canada’s line of argument regarding the interpretation of
“enforcement” was favourably received by the Secretariat. The
Secretariat agreed that “enforcement” should be given a broad definition
that encompasses more than prosecutions. 48 Much of the Secretariat’s
factual findings revolved around the effectiveness of Canada’s WUP
process as a means to achieve No Net Loss of fish habitat.
B.

ONTARIO LOGGING I & II

The saga of Ontario Logging I & II is interesting for a variety of
reasons, perhaps most notably the intervention of the Council into the
SEM process, an intervention that arguably resulted in raising the burden
of proof that submitters must meet. 49 On February 4, 2002, the Sierra
Legal Defence Fund filed a submission against Canada alleging a failure
to enforce laws protecting migratory bird nests from clear-cut logging
operations in the province of Ontario. 50 The submission was filed on
behalf of the following groups: Canadian Nature Federation, Canadian
Parks and Wilderness Society, Earthroots, Federation of Ontario
Naturalists, Great Lakes United, Sierra Club (United States), Sierra Club
of Canada, and Wildlands League. The submitters alleged that Canada
failed to “effectively enforce subsection 6(a) of the Migratory Birds
Regulations against the logging industry in Ontario.” 51
Section 6(a) of the Migratory Birds Regulations states in the
relevant part that “no person shall . . . disturb, destroy or take a nest, egg,
nest shelter, eider duck shelter or duck box of a migratory bird.”52 This is
47

Id. at 16-17, 22.
COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FINAL FACTUAL RECORD FOR SUBMISSION (SEM97-001), at 35 (May 30, 2000), available at www.cec.org/Storage/68/6220_BC-Hydr-Factrecord_en.pdf.
49
Geoff Garver, Tooth Decay, 25 THE ENVTL. F. 34, 36-37 (2008), available at
www.sierraclub.org/trade/downloads/nafta-tooth-decay.pdf.
50
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Submission to the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
CEC Doc. A14/SEM/02-001/01/SUB (Feb. 4, 2002), available at www.cec.org/Storage/83/7894_021-sub-e.pdf [hereinafter Ontario Logging Submission].
51
Id. at 1 (citation omitted).
52
Migratory Birds Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1035, s. 6(a) (Can.).
48
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a regulation enacted pursuant to section 12(1) of the federal Migratory
Birds Convention Act (MBCA). 53 Section 13(1)(a) of the MBCA makes
it an offence to contravene the Act or its regulations. At the time of the
submission, Environment Canada administered the MBCA through the
Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS).
In the province of Ontario, the provincial Ministry of Natural
Resources (MNR) manages forestry activities through a Forest
Management Plan (FMP) for each designated forest area, called a Forest
Management Unit (FMU). According to their initial submission, the
submitters estimated that over 85,000 nests of migratory birds had been
destroyed by clear-cut logging during 2001 in fifty-nine FMUs. 54 The
submitters asserted that these FMPs had been prepared without regard to
migratory bird protection and with little input from the federal
government. 55 The submitters also alleged that the CWS was aware of
such nest destruction, and that CWS officials called this “incidental”
kill. 56
The submitters challenged the approach taken by the CWS in the
enforcement of the MBCA. The submitters made an Access to
Information request to Environment Canada, seeking all documents
related to efforts by both Environment Canada and the CWS to enforce
section 6(a) of the Migratory Bird Regulations. This request revealed that
no investigation or charges against Ontario’s logging industry had been
made in 2001. 57 The submitters argued that the CWS had been aware
that the incidental destruction of migratory bird nests was illegal, but had
declined to prosecute in the belief that cooperation with industry would
yield better results. 58 The submitters claimed that there was no evidence
to support the belief that such a “vague strategy” was more effective than
enforcement, and that the CWS had no authority to choose not to enforce
certain laws in the interest of economic gains.59
The Council initially rejected the Secretariat’s recommendation that
the development of a factual record was warranted. The Council
reasoned that the submission had been based on estimations and had
failed to provide specific instances of enforcement failure. 60 Given these
53

Migratory Birds Convention Act, S.C. 1994, c. 22, s. 12(1) (Can.).
Ontario Logging Submission, supra note 50, at 5.
55
Id. at 6.
56
Id. at 5.
57
Id. at 6.
58
Id. at 7-8.
59
Id. at 8-9.
60
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion That Canada Is Failing to Effectively Enforce
54
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deficiencies, the Council gave the submitters 120 days to provide further
information. 61 The Council’s decision not to adopt the Secretariat’s
recommendation drew criticism from both the JPAC and the Canadian
NAC. In an advice letter to the Government Committee dated March 17,
2003, the Canadian NAC expressed concern over the Council’s
interference with the independence of the Secretariat in carrying out its
mandated functions, and recommended that Canada support the
Secretariat’s recommendation to develop a factual record. 62 JPAC
echoed this concern stating that the Council’s resolution created a
“higher evidentiary threshold” for submitters that might “render it
prohibitively difficult for citizens to participate in the process.” 63
The submitters filed supplementary evidence on August 20, 2003, in
response to the Council’s resolution. Using actual data from the MNR,
the submitters provided more accurate assessments of the number of
nests destroyed in forty-nine of the original fifty-nine FMUs in the
submission. 64 The submitters also provided information on four
additional FMUs in a separate submission (Ontario Logging II). 65 The
Council approved the development of factual records for both these
submissions and instructed the Secretariat to consolidate them into one
factual record. 66

Section 6(a) of the Migratory Bird Regulations (MBR) Adopted Under the Migratory Birds
Convention Act, 1994 (MBCA) (SEM 02-001), Council Resolution 03-05, CEC Doc. C/C.01/0302/RES/05/final (Apr. 22, 2003), available at www.cec.org/Storage/72/6574_02-1-RES-E.pdf.
61
Id.
62
Letter from Can. Nat’l Advisory Comm. to Governmental Comm. (Mar. 17, 2003),
available at www.naaec.gc.ca/eng/nac/adv032_e.htm.
63
Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Limiting the Scope of Factual Records and Review of the
Operation of CEC Council Resolution 00-09 Related to Articles 14 and 15 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Advice to Council 03-05, CEC Doc. J/03-05/ADV/Final
(Dec.
17,
2003),
available
at
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=1274&SiteNodeID=295&BL_ExpandID=.
64
CANADIAN NATURE FED’N ET AL., SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN RESPONSE TO COUNCIL RESOLUTION 03-05 (Aug. 20,
2003), available at www.cec.org/Storage/72/6589_02-1-supplementary%20information_en.pdf.
65
CANADIAN NATURE FED’N ET AL., SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (Oct. 5, 2004), available at www.cec.org/Storage/83/7895_04-6SUB_en.pdf.
66
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion That Canada Is Failing to Effectively Enforce
Section 6(a) of the Migratory Bird Regulations (MBR) Adopted Under the Migratory Birds
Convention Act, 1994 (MBCA) (SEM-02-001), Council Resolution 04-03, CEC Doc. C/C.01/0401/RES/03 (Mar. 12, 2004), available at www.cec.org/Storage/75/6898_02-1-Res04-03_en.pdf;
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation Regarding the Assertion That Canada Is Failing to Effectively Enforce Section 6(a) of
the Migratory Bird Regulations (MBR) Adopted Under the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994
(MBCA) (SEM-04-006), Council Resolution 05-04, CEC Doc. C/C.01/05/RES/04/Final (Apr. 1,
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Canada raised three issues with the original submission prior to
responding to the submitters’ allegations. First, it suggested that the
submitters did not adequately pursue other civil remedies prior to making
their SEM submission. 67 Second, Canada noted that the CWS had been
trying to set up a meeting with several of the submitters and other
environmental organizations to discuss the enforcement of the MBCA by
the CWS and its overall enforcement approach. 68 Canada claimed,
however, that the submitters had delayed the meeting until after the filing
of the submission. 69 Third, Canada pointed out that the submission
contained no allegations of specific instances of enforcement failure. 70
Canada denied that it failed to enforce section 6(a) of the Migratory
Bird Regulations with respect to the logging industry in Ontario in two
ways. First, Canada questioned the submitters’ estimation of the potential
impact of logging on migratory bird nests claiming that the estimation
was based on scarce data. 71 Canada also noted that the CWS was aware
that provincial guidelines regarding forest resource licensing included
biodiversity components, and that federal input was invited in the
development of FMPs. 72 Second, Canada denied the submitters’
allegation that the CWS had a sweeping policy of non-enforcement in the
logging sector. 73
Similar to BC Hydro, Canada’s response in Ontario Logging
included a discussion and defense of the enforcement approach taken by
Environment Canada and the CWS. In fact, Canada asserted again that
“[e]nforcement is understood to include a broad range of activities from
inspections, investigation and prosecution to education, compliance
promotion, regulation development and public reporting, among
others.” 74 Canada argued that wildlife enforcement priorities must
balance public concern, conservation science, and international
commitments. 75 Given limited resources and broad geographic scope,
certain enforcement options would have higher priorities than others. 76
2005), available at www.cec.org/Storage/75/6913_04-6-Resolution_en.pdf.
67
Comm’n for Envtl.Cooperation, Response to Submission SEM-02-001, at 1, CEC Doc.
A14/SEM/02-001/12/RSP(Apr. 11, 2002), available at www.cec.org/Storage/88/8479_02-1-RSPE.pdf.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 2.
70
Id. at 2-3.
71
Id. at 5.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 7.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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Canada claimed that the more appropriate enforcement approaches in the
forestry sector were compliance promotion and education among
industry, rather than enforcement through the courts. 77 Nevertheless,
should compliance promotion fail, Environment Canada would conduct
investigations and lay charges. 78 Finally, Canada noted that only one
complaint had been filed regarding section 6(a) of the Migratory Bird
Regulations and logging in Ontario, and that Environment Canada
recorded and followed-up on the complaint. 79 However, Environment
Canada received no complaint from the submitters. 80
Canada also challenged the reliability of the submitters’ estimates of
nest destruction. It contended that the submitters failed to demonstrate
that any logging had actually occurred during nesting season for
migratory birds in 2001, or that any nests had been destroyed as a result
of such logging. 81 It further argued that the submission was based on
inappropriate assumptions, and that a factual record should be based on
allegations of specific instances rather than hypotheses. 82 Finally,
Canada offered additional information on the enforcement approach
taken by the CWS, including continuing attempts to create dialogue with
industry and environmental groups regarding conservation and
compliance with the MBCA. 83
On the whole, the Secretariat’s factual record in this case was less
favourable to Canada than in BC Hydro. While Canada had indicated that
it was focusing enforcement efforts on species with conservation priority,
the Secretariat noted that information gaps still existed despite decades’
worth of monitoring efforts to ascertain population data of migratory
birds. 84 The Secretariat found that the CWS website contained no
information for the public on how and where to file complaints, even
though Canada had stated that determining where to focus enforcement
efforts depended in part on complaints from the public. 85 The Secretariat
also found the CWS did “not have the resources to strictly enforce

77

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-9.
79
Id. at 9.
80
Id.
81
GOV’T OF CAN., RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 3 (Oct. 16, 2003), available
at www.cec.org/Storage/72/6595_02-1-PTS_en.pdf.
82
Id. at 4.
83
Id. at 4-6.
84
COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FACTUAL RECORD: ONTARIO LOGGING SUBMISSION
(SEM-02-001) & ONTARIO LOGGING II SUBMISSION (SEM-04-006), at 8 (June 2006), available at
www.cec.org/Storage/75/6907_CCE_21_english.pdf.
85
Id. at 8-9.
78
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section 6(a) of the [Migratory Bird Regulations].” 86
C.

PULP AND PAPER

Our first case study (BC Hydro) marked the first time a SEM
submission against Canada culminated in the development of a factual
record. Our final case study represents the last time a submission
involving Canada has culminated in the preparation of a factual record.
The Sierra Legal Defence Fund filed the Pulp and Paper submission
under Article 14 of the NAAEC on May 6, 2002. The submission was
filed on behalf of Friends of the Earth, Union Saint-Laurent, Grands
Lacs, Conservation Council of New Brunswick, Ecology Action Centre,
and Environment North. The submitters alleged that Canada had failed to
effectively enforce sections 34, 36, 40, 78, and 78.1 of the federal
Fisheries Act 87 and sections 5 and 6 and Schedules I and II of the Pulp
and Paper Effluent Regulations (PPER) 88 against pulp and paper mills in
Ontario, Québec, and the Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador). 89
Section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act states:
Subject to subsection (4), no person shall deposit or permit the deposit
of a deleterious substance of any type in water frequented by fish or in
any place under any conditions where the deleterious substance or any
other deleterious substance that results from the deposit of the
deleterious substance may enter any such water.

Subsection (4) allows for deposits authorized by regulation, while
“deleterious substance” is defined in section 34. Section 40(2) makes it
an offence to contravene section 36(3), and sections 78 and 78.1 are the
penalty provisions.
The PPER states that the following mill effluents are considered
“deleterious substances” for the purposes of the Fisheries Act: a) acutely
lethal effluent, b) biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) matter, and c)
suspended solids. 90 The PPER contains an absolute prohibition on
acutely lethal effluent, but it allows for authorized discharge of BOD
matter and suspended solids. Schedule I describes the prescribed

86

Id. at 10.
Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 35(1), amended by 2012, c. 19, s. 142 (Can.).
88
Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations, SOR/92-269 (Can.).
89
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH ET AL., SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 2 (May 6, 2002), available at www.cec.org/Storage/83/7896_01-SUB.pdf.
90
Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations, SOR/92-269, s. 3 (Can.).
87
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methods for testing the level of these substances. In the event of a failure
of an effluent to pass the prescribed test, Schedule II also describes the
required follow-up testing and monitoring procedures.
The submitters alleged two categories of enforcement failure: 1) the
failure of mill effluent to pass the prescribed deleterious substance test,
and 2) the failure of mills to carry out the required follow-up when there
is an effluent test failure. 91 In total, the submitters alleged that there had
been more than 2,400 documented violations of federal law at mills in
Central and Atlantic Canada from 1995 to 2000, but that only eight mills
had been prosecuted under federal law. 92
The submission addressed alleged violations in each of the three
regions studied by the submitters. In Québec, the submitters alleged
1,093 violations from 1995 to 2000. 93 In the year 2000 alone, twenty-six
mills were supposedly responsible for 171 violations. 94 In Ontario, the
submitters claimed that there had been 232 violations from 1995 to
2000. 95 They noted also that Ontario had had a pattern of more
prosecutions and fewer violations when compared to Québec and the
Atlantic provinces. 96 The Atlantic provinces supposedly had 1,081
violations from 1995 to 2000. 97 However, the submitters noted that they
had obtained only partial data for certain years and no data in 1999, and
so the number of violations might have been underestimated.98
In spite of the large number of violations, the submitters found that
from 1995 to 2000 there had been only six prosecutions under the federal
Fisheries Act in Ontario, two in the Atlantic provinces, and none in
Québec, although they found five prosecutions under the provincial
Québec Environmental Quality Act. 99 Perhaps in anticipation of the
Canadian government’s response, the submission stated that “[w]hile the
Submitters do not simply equate prosecution (and fines) . . . with
effective enforcement, such prosecutions are an important enforcement
tool that has been effective where used.” 100 The submitters claimed that
due to the lack of effective enforcement, some “free riders”—certain
mills with a large number of violations but very few to no prosecutions—
91

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH ET AL., supra note 89, at 6.
Id. at 1.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 7.
95
Id. at 1.
96
Id. at 9.
97
Id. at 1.
98
Id. at 10.
99
Id. app. 5.
100
Id. at 2.
92
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had been allowed to operate. 101
Finally, the submitters argued that the lack of enforcement was
contrary to the federal government’s own Fisheries Act Habitat
Protection and Pollution Prevention Provisions, Compliance and
Enforcement Policy (Compliance and Enforcement Policy).102 The
submitters claimed that the intent of the Compliance and Enforcement
Policy was “to ensure that violators will comply with the Fisheries Act
within the shortest possible time, that violations are not repeated and that
all available enforcement tools are used.” 103
Canada provided its Party Response to the Secretariat on August 6,
2002. 104 As with the previous responses, Canada provided a description
of the federal agency’s enforcement approach, consistent with its
longstanding advocacy of a broad definition of enforcement for the
purpose of Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC. The response also
included an explanation of Environment Canada’s enforcement response
in specific cases highlighted in the submission. However, out of the
sixty-six mills for which the submitters had data on violations, and
prosecutions listed in their appendix, Canada provided responses only for
the twelve mills that the submitters had specifically highlighted in the
body of their submission.
According to Canada’s response, the Compliance and Enforcement
Policy directed Environment Canada officials to choose the appropriate
enforcement action (which ranged from warning, to inspector’s direction,
to prosecution) based on the nature of the violation, the likelihood of
achieving the desired result, and consistency in enforcement.105 Factors
that went into assessing the nature of the violation included 1)
seriousness of the (potential) environmental damage, 2) intent of the
alleged violator, 3) repeat occurrences, and 4) attempts by the violator to
circumvent enforcement. 106 In considering the likelihood of achieving
the desired result, factors included 1) history of compliance, 2)
willingness to cooperate, 3) extent of corrective action already taken, and
4) enforcement actions by other government authorities. 107 Finally, the
decision to proceed with prosecution ultimately rested with the Attorney

101

Id. at 12.
Id. at 4.
103
Id.
104
GOV’T OF CAN., RESPONSE TO SUBMISSION SEM-02-003 (Aug. 6, 2002), available at
www.cec.org/Storage/72/6634_02-3-Rsp-e.pdf.
105
Id. at 3.
106
Id.
107
Id.
102
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General of Canada. 108
Using the discussion of the federal agency’s enforcement approach
as the policy context, Canada’s response then provided explanations for
the enforcement action taken by Environment Canada at each of the
twelve mills highlighted in the submission. In three instances,
Environment Canada took no action because the mill in question had
taken its own corrective action after effluent test failures. 109 In two
instances, violations were overlooked because they were due to
temporary maintenance activities. 110 In many cases, Environment Canada
opted to give written warnings or notices of infraction rather than
proceeding with prosecution. 111 Lastly, Canada declined to provide
information on five mills due to ongoing investigations. 112
The factual record in this case was quite limited in scope relative to
the original submission. The Council instructed the Secretariat to develop
a factual record only for ten mills, and only for enforcement failures in
2000, except for one mill, which the Secretariat was allowed to examine
from 1996 to 2000. 113 At those mills in the time period examined, the
Secretariat found that Environment Canada had responded to at least
1,246 violations. 114 According to the Secretariat’s factual findings,
Environment Canada responded to these violations with ten warnings,
twenty investigations (including on-site inspections and sampling), five
charges laid, and no enforcement action in eleven instances. 115
IV. TRENDS IN CANADA’S RESPONSES TO CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS
An examination of Canada’s responses in these three cases reveals
some notable patterns. We will summarize these patterns here and will
analyze their significance in Part V. As expected, when the submissions
have alleged specific instances of enforcement failure, Canada has

108

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5-28.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation Regarding the Assertion That Canada Is Failing to Effectively Enforce
Sections 34, 36, 40 78 and 78.1 of the Federal Fisheries Act and Sections 5 and 6 and Schedules I
and II of the Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations (PPER) Promulgated in 1992 (SEM-02-003),
Council Res. 03-16, CEC Doc. C/C.01/RES/16/final (Dec. 11, 2003), available at
www.cec.org/Storage/72/6640_02-3-Res_en.pdf.
114
COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FACTUAL RECORD: PULP AND PAPER SUBMISSION
26-31 (June 2006), available at www.cec.org/Storage/72/6649_SEM-02-003-FR_en.pdf.
115
Id.
109
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responded in kind by offering detailed denials. More intriguing, however,
is the manner and consistency with which Canada, in all of these cases,
has asserted the view that the submissions are inconsistent with the
broader interpretation of “effective enforcement” it claims the Secretariat
should adopt.
The detail with which Canada has responded to submissions is
especially evident in the BC Hydro and Pulp and Paper cases. In BC
Hydro, the submitters alleged seven ways in which B.C. Hydro
operations harmed fish habitat. In response, Canada made three general
rebuttals to these seven allegations before making specific rebuttals
against each of them. Furthermore, Canada’s response included a table of
specific orders and authorizations issued to B.C. Hydro from 1990 to
1997. In Pulp and Paper, Canada made detailed responses to allegations
of enforcement failure at twelve mills highlighted in the submission.
Canada’s response in Ontario Logging I & II differs in this regard from
the other two cases because the submitters had made no specific
allegations such as targeted accusations against any particular logging
company.
The most striking trend that emerges from the case studies,
however, is the manner and consistency with which Canada articulated
its views on the question of how “effective enforcement” should be
interpreted, and on the proper scope of factual records. In all three cases,
Canada consistently took the position that “effective enforcement” for
the purposes of the NAAEC meant more than the number of
prosecutions. BC Hydro was the first case in which Canada made the
argument for an expansive interpretation of “effective enforcement” that
included a range of enforcement options, from voluntary compliance and
compliance agreements to legal and judicial sanctions. In Ontario
Logging I & II, Canada expanded the list even further to include
inspections, education, compliance promotion, regulation development,
and public reporting. Likewise, in Pulp and Paper, enforcement was
defined to range from warnings, to inspector’s direction, to prosecution.
In order to show that the range of enforcement options available to
federal authorities forms part of a larger enforcement framework,
Canada’s responses invariably included descriptions of the relevant
regulatory framework. For example, in BC Hydro Canada went to great
lengths in describing the federal regulatory regime relating to the
protection of fish and fish habitat, such as Regional Technical
Committees, provincial Water Use Planning initiatives, and Water
Quality Guidelines. Similarly, in Pulp and Paper, Canada’s response
described Environment Canada’s Compliance and Enforcement Policy
relative to Fisheries Act violations at pulp mills, including the range of
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factors that federal officials would consider in determining the
appropriate enforcement action. Likewise, in Ontario Logging I & II,
Canada discussed in detail the enforcement approach taken by the CWS,
especially in the area of compliance promotion through dialogue with
industry and environmental groups.
V.

UNDERSTANDING CANADA’S RESPONSES TO CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS:
THE ROLE OF THEORY

What explains the consistency and tenacity with which Canada has
advocated for such a broad interpretation of “effective enforcement”?
There is no obvious reason for Canada to adopt such a stance. Canada’s
responses could simply have consisted of replies to the specific instances
of enforcement failures that had been alleged, particularly in the BC
Hydro and Pulp and Paper cases. In terms of what Canada technically
needed to provide to the Secretariat, such narrow responses would have
been enough. Instead, Canada’s responses not only countered those
specific allegations, but also pushed the Secretariat to consider the larger
regulatory scheme.
Can theory be harnessed to explain this apparent pattern? The
discussion below uses three theoretical lenses to examine this question: a
realist perspective, a pluralist perspective, and an institutionalist
perspective. Ultimately, we conclude that it is this third perspective that
likely offers the most potential to explain how Canada has to date
engaged with the citizen submission process.
A.

REALIST PERSPECTIVE

The realist perspective understands the behaviour of states as being
driven largely by the enduring struggle to maintain sovereignty. The
sovereign state exists in a competitive international environment, with
survival dependent on a jealous guarding of autonomous control over the
state’s affairs. Hobbes provides a popular characterization of this
struggle: a state maintains the “posture of Gladiators” in order to ensure
that its absolute sovereignty remains unchallenged. 116 However, the
absoluteness of state sovereignty may be eroded through participation in
the international arena, because “states acting together through
negotiated legal instruments can accede sovereignty over specified issues

116

Alan Chong, Classical Realism and Tension Between Sovereignty and Intervention:
Constructions of Expediency from Machiavelli, Hobbes and Bodin, 8 J. INT’L REL. & DEV. 257, 272
(2005).
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to a supranational institution.” 117 At least in some measure, can Canada’s
response to SEM submissions be explained as an effort to protect its
sovereignty?
Some scholars have studied the relationship between the NAAEC
and state sovereignty. 118 These studies tended to focus on the impact of
the NAAEC on the sovereignty of the Parties, rather than on how the
Parties have reacted to possible intrusions on sovereignty by the CEC.
Throughout the design and implementation of the SEM process, Parties
“have tended to exhibit a highly protectionist approach to defending their
Westphalian sovereignty.” 119 However, in practice, the SEM process is
like a “fire alarm” that empowers citizens to bring negative attention to
the targeted Party. 120 As such, the SEM process may threaten a Party’s
sovereignty to the extent that it “has the potential to influence a Party’s
behaviour should it become the focus of such a submission.” 121
In drafting the NAAEC, the Parties ensured that this trilateral
agreement impedes state sovereignty as little as possible. The preamble
to the NAAEC reaffirms “the sovereign right of States to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and development
policies.” 122 Article 3 states:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection and environmental development
policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its own
environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its
laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental
protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and
regulations. 123

However, the NAAEC does not define “high” and Parties only need
to “strive.” 124 Article 5 states that “each Party shall effectively enforce its
environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental

117

Sarah Richardson, Sovereignty, Trade, and the Environment—The North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 183, 184 (1998).
118
See, e.g., id.; Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen
Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L. L. 141 (2002).
119
Tollefson, supra note 118, at 146.
120
Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 389, 390 (2004).
121
Richardson, supra note 117, at 193.
122
NAAEC, supra note 5, pmbl.
123
Id. art. 3.
124
Richardson, supra note 117, at 190.
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action.” 125 The Parties are fulfilling this commitment trilaterally through
a North American Working Group on Environmental Enforcement and
Compliance. 126
Turning to Articles 14 and 15, Parties retain a high level of control
over the SEM process. The Secretariat may prepare factual records only
with the approval of the Council by two-thirds vote. 127 Parties can
comment on the draft factual record, and the Secretariat must incorporate
those comments as appropriate into the final factual record. 128 Finally,
the Council retains the ultimate authority to decide whether to publish a
factual record. 129
While the foregoing demonstrates that the Parties were very alert to
potential threats to their sovereignty during the drafting of the NAAEC,
it is not clear that this perspective can explain the trend in Canada’s
response to SEM submissions. The realist sovereignty perspective does
not, for example, help us understand why Canada has so consistently
argued in favour of a very specific interpretation of “effective
enforcement” as opposed to merely addressing the specific allegations of
enforcement failures. It is not clear that the former response protects
sovereignty over domestic environmental law enforcement policy more
than the latter. As noted above, Parties retain significant control over the
SEM process, and factual records do not assign fault but are merely a
summary of factual findings. In terms of asserting domestic sovereignty
over the environmental law enforcement, a curt response from Canada
would have served just as well as a much lengthier one that
comprehensively catalogued the relevant regulatory regimes in question.
Perhaps the limitation of this theoretical perspective in explaining
Canada’s responses is partly due to its ontology. As Professor Krasner
reminds us, “Realism is a theory about international politics. It is an
effort to explain both the behaviour of individual states and the
characteristics of the international system as a whole.” 130 The concept of
sovereignty is best employed to understand state-to-state behaviour. In
this case, the actor with which Canada interacts—the Secretariat—is
neither a separate sovereign entity nor an entity to which Canada has
acceded sovereignty. Moreover, the Secretariat remains subject to the
direction and veto of the Council, a body to which Canada belongs.
125

NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 5(1).
Richardson, supra note 117, at 191.
127
NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15(2).
128
Id. art. 15(5), (6).
129
Id. art. 15(7).
130
Stephen D. Krasner, Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy: A Response to Gilbert, 20
POL. THEORY 38, 39 (1992) (emphasis in original).
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PLURALIST PERSPECTIVE

In a pluralist democracy, there is a marketplace of ideas and policies
held by different actors or groups of actors. These actors have differing
levels of resources and influence. As a result, “the pattern of [public]
policy will reflect the distribution of power and influence.” 131 Within
Canada’s multiparty political system, voters choose from a number of
political parties that represent different bundles of ideas and policies.
While policy outcomes may depend on more than whoever is in power,
control over formal policy agency is in the hands of elected officials. 132
Trends in public policy may then be traced by the flow of people who are
in political office. To the extent that both Canada’s stance in its
interpretation of “effective enforcement,” and Canada’s responses to
SEM submissions are policy, Canada’s domestic politics may offer some
explanation.
A brief look at the history of the Canadian political landscape
quickly dispels the usefulness of this theoretical perspective in this
present case. While Canada’s responses to submissions have been quite
consistent over the three SEM cases, the Canadian political landscape
has experienced quite dramatic changes. The three cases span a ten-year
period from the April 1997 submission of BC Hydro to February 2007
publication of the facutal record in Pulp and Paper. Over this decade,
Canadians have voted in three prime ministers from two different
political parties: Jean Chrétien (Liberal Party of Canada (Lib.)), Paul
Martin (Lib.), and Stephen Harper (Conservative Party of Canada
(Con.)). Canada has also witnessed six Ministers of the Environment:
Sergio Marchi (Lib.), Christine Stewart (Lib.), David Anderson (Lib.),
Stéphane Dion (Lib.), Rona Ambrose (Con.), and John Baird (Con.).
The difference in the government’s attitude to environmental issues
between Stéphane Dion’s tenure as Minister of the Environment and
Rona Ambrose’s is striking. Stéphane Dion was seen as a champion of
environmental causes. Through his efforts, Canada got the signatories to
the Kyoto Protocol to extend the international agreement beyond 2012 at
a conference held in Montréal in 2005. 133 In contrast, Canada rapidly
retreated from its Kyoto commitments when the new Conservative
government came to power in 2006. 134
131

Richard Simeon, Studying Public Policy, 9 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 548, 568 (1976).
Charles D. Elder & Roger W. Cobb, Aging and Public Policy: The Politics of Agenda
Setting, 13 POL’Y STUD. J. 115, 118 (2005).
133
Janice Harvey, Climate Change Conference a Victory for Multilateralism and the Earth,
TELEGRAPH-JOURNAL, Dec. 14, 2005..
134
Allan Woods, Conservatives Won’t Be Bound by Kyoto, Ambrose Says, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
132
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Despite the changes in prime ministers and Ministers of the
Environment, Canada’s attitude toward SEM submissions remained the
same throughout. The Canadian government’s responses showed no
indication of a more favourable disposition toward the allegations of the
submitters during the years that the Liberal Party was in office than
during the years the Conservatives held the reins of power. In short,
domestic politics does not seem to have a bearing on Canada’s response
to SEM submissions.
Of course, modern scholarship recognizes that changes in domestic
policy result from a confluence of factors. “Policy windows”—
opportunities to set the formal agenda—open up when issues (problem
stream) converge with institutional circumstances (politics stream) and
the development of policy solutions (policy stream). 135 The pluralistic set
of policy entrepreneurs from both inside and outside government may
take advantage of these policy windows to affect policy outcomes.
Differences in the national leadership may bring different sets of issues
into the political foreground, such as meeting Canada’s international
commitments towards environment protection. That alone, however, may
not be enough to generate different policy outcomes if the right
institutional setting is not in place, or the appropriate set of policy tools is
not available.
C.

INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE

The institutionalist perspective seeks to explain the behaviour of
actors by understanding the boundaries of acceptable behaviours
imposed by the institution within which the actors exist. As a matter of
definition, “institution” here refers to what Professor Keohane terms
“specific institution,” which is a particular human-constructed and
organized arrangement. 136 This is in contrast to “general institution,”
which is a general pattern or categorization of activity. 137 For example,
marriage is a general institution, while the CEC is a specific institution.
Specific institutions can be identified by “persistent sets of rules that
constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles.” 138
Much of the empirical work done by institutionalists has focused on
Feb. 18, 2006, at A6.
135
Michael Howlett, Predictable and Unpredictable Policy Windows: Institutional and
Exogenous Correlates of Canadian Federal Agenda-Setting, 31 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 495, 497 (1998).
136
Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379,
383 (1988).
137
Id.
138
Id. at 384.
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how institutions are created. Theories on the conditions that allow for
actors to form institutions for cooperation and compliance have formed a
staple of institutionalist research for quite some time. 139 However, there
has also been empirical work that treats institutions as the independent
variable that may explain state behaviour.140 Insight into the reasons
behind the trend in Canada’s responses to SEM submissions may be
gained by examining the rules and structure of the SEM process.
One of the oft-repeated criticisms ofthe SEM process is that the
Parties have treated the process as an adversarial one. 141 This is not
surprising, given the nature of the SEM process itself. Granted, there are
a few features of this process that lend themselves to encouraging more
cooperative postures from the Parties. For example, the factual record is
non-binding on the Party against which the submission was made, and
the Council has a high degree of control over the scope of the factual
record that the Secretariat is instructed to develop. These features lower
the political stakes for the Parties involved, allowing for greater potential
for cooperation.
Ultimately, however, the SEM process more closely resembles an
adversarial litigation model rather than a more cooperative mediation- or
negotiation-based model. The process commences with submitters filing
a complaint against a particular Party, alleging a specified failure to
effectively enforce its environmental law contrary to Article 5 of the
NAAEC. If the submission passes screening requirements, the Secretariat
gathers arguments from both sides before producing a factual record.
Throughout this process, the NAAEC does not provide for the Secretariat
to convene with the submitters and representatives of the Party together
to discuss their points of contention. And while the factual record is nonbinding on the Party, the Secretariat’s factual findings can (and
sometimes do) favour one side over the other. Thus, the function of the
Secretariat is similar to a judge hearing argument from two opposing
sides before rendering judgment.
In such an adversarial setting, the most advantageous strategy for a
Party against whom a submission has been filed is to bring every
argument to bear in the Party Response. Just as in a courtroom there is
almost always no advantage to a party for eschewing even a remotely
139

See generally Michael J. Gilligan & Leslie Johns, Formal Models of International
Institutions, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 221 (2012).
140
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relevant legal or evidentiary argument, there was no advantage for
Canada in any of the three cases highlighted in the previous section to
abstain from arguing that Canada was effectively enforcing its
environmental laws through comprehensive regulatory regimes. As long
as the CEC, as an institution, is governed by the same written (and
unwritten) rules and conventions, it seems likely that Canada’s strategy
in the SEM process will remain unchanged.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this Article, we examined three cases in which citizen groups
have filed submissions against Canada under Article 14 of the NAAEC.
These cases show that Canada has consistently argued for a broad
interpretation of “effective enforcement.” Appealing to a broader
meaning of “effective enforcement” expands the range of arguments
available to the responding Party and reduces the likelihood of an
unfavourable factual record. This tactic is consistent with a party acting
within a set of institutional rules that create, in practice, an adversarial
process.
Of course, in drawing up these findings we examined only the
responses from Canada. This research is an initial attempt to understand
the SEM process from the perspectives of the Party signatories, using
Canada as the exemplar. Further research is needed to determine whether
the institutionalist theory is a persuasive way for understanding
government responses to SEM submissions more generally, further
research is needed. If the Mexican and American Party responses to, and
their interactions with, the SEM process are consistent with our initial
findings, it may speak to a need to rethink the architecture of the SEM
process to encourage more constructive engagement by the NAFTA
Parties. On the other hand, if a close examination of American and
Mexican responses to citizen submissions over time reveals a different
pattern, this may undermine an institutionalist explanation of Canada’s
behaviour and suggest that a more complex dynamic is at work.
As a final note of caution, these case studies, while useful, offer
only a partial picture of the Parties’ behaviour. Our study focused on
behaviour that is a matter of public record. It is important to
acknowledge, however, that the SEM process also has a more “private”
side involving significant backroom maneuvring that for the most part is
obscured from public scrutiny. For example, during the BC Hydro
process, the Canadian government lobbied the Council to sequester from
the public confidential and sensitive information tendered by the
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Parties. 142 Studying the inner workings of the Council is important to
fully understanding how Parties are behaving within these institutional
rules. Accordingly, research into this dimension of the institutionalized
politics of the CEC and the SEM process should also be a priority and
has the potential to offer significant insights.
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